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i 一 ⑩ 
本論文硏究Paillier密碼系統。大部分密碼系統根據的活板門函數爲RSA或離算 
對數問題(discrete logarithm)�Paillier 硏究別的活板門函數——Composite degree 






Abstract of thesis entitled: 
Identity-Based Cryptography from Paillier Cryptosystem 
Submitted by AU Man Ho Allen 
for the degree of Master of Philosophy 
at The Chinese University of Hong Kong in June 2005 
Majority of cryptographic systems relies on one of the two trap-
door mechanism, namely, RSA and discrete logarithm. Paillier 
studied cryptosystem based on other trapdoor mechanism, the 
composite degree residuosity class, and proposed the Paillier 
cryptosystem. 
This dissertation studies the Paillier cryptosystem. Although 
it turns out that Paillier cryptosystem relies on the difficulty 
of computing the RSA problem, the trapdoor mechansim from 
Paillier is useful for many applications. 
Identity-based identification schemes allows users to prove 
their identities to verifiers. Several efficient realizations of the 
concept, based on Paillier Cryptosystem, are being proposed. 
Furthermore, our constructions can be turned into identity-based 
i 
signature schemes easily using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. We 
also reformat the identity-based encryption scheme from Cocks 
to make it compatible with our setting. 
We provide evidence that our constructions are secure by pre-
senting reduction proofs in the random oracle model. Security 
of our constructions depends on well-studied hard problems. 
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Diffie and Hellman started the revolution in cryptography with 
their classic paper "New Directions in Cryptography"[14] in 
1976. They invented the concept of public key cryptography 
and make secret communication possible over insecure channel 
without a prior exchange of a secret key. 
Consider the situation when Alice wishes to communicate 
with Bob over an insecure channel. In public key cryptography, 
Alice request Bob to send his public key e to Alice first. She 
then encrypts the message using e. No one other than Bob 
can decrypt the message because only he know the private key 
d. In this way, they can communicate secretly over any public 
channel. 
However, opponent Oscar can still defeat the system by im-
personating Bob and send his own public key e' to Alice when she 
1 
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request for Bob's public key. He can then intercept and decrypt 
the message Alice encrypted using e'. Therefore, it is necessary 
that Alice must be convinced that she is encrypting under the 
legitimate public key of Bob. The use of digital certificate is one 
solution to the problem. Instead of sending Alice Bob's public 
key, Bob can send his digital certificate that contains his public 
key. The solution is, however, somehow tedious. 
In 1984, Shamir [39] proposed the idea of using the identity 
of the recipient as public key directly. This is known as identity-
based cryptography. Back to our example, when Alice wishes to 
communicate with Bob, she simply encrypt the message using 
the bit string “ Bob" as public key and thus eliminate the request 
of public key or digital certificate. 
On the other hand, the asymmetry of key also make it pos-
sible for the development of digital signature. Here, the private 
key is used to sign a message and the public key is used to verify 
the signature. A closely related concept is identification proto-
col for which the owner of a public key shows the verifier that 
he is the legitimate owner by proving that he knows the secret 
key correspond to the public key. 
Public key cryptography has been a very active research area 
in the academia. Many realizations of encryption scheme and 
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digital signature scheme were proposed. Paillier encryption and 
signature scheme [32] is one of which being proposed. Based on 
these primitives, many more complex systems are being devised. 
This dissertation is about Identity-based identification scheme 
based on Paillier cryptosystem. The rest of this thesis is or-
ganized as follow. Chapter 2 provides the mathematical and 
cryptographical background. This includes number theory, Al-
geria and complexity theory. A brief introduction to public key 
cryptography is also given. 
In Chapter 3 we talk about the Paillier cryptosystem for 
which our results are based on. We talk about the background 
of Paillier cryptosystem and outline what it is. Then we discuss 
several encryption schemes related to Paillier cryptosystem. 
Chapter 4 is about Identity-based cryptography. We review 
Identity-based encryption scheme, signature scheme and identi-
fication scheme. Cocks' identity-based encryption scheme[ll] is 
also discussed here. 
In Chapter 5 we presented our constructions of identity-based 
identification scheme from Paillier cryptosystem. We also refor-
mat Cocks' identity-based encryption scheme in Paillier setting. 
We concluded in Chapter 6 by giving certain possible future 
research directions. 
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This chapter introduces topics of complexity theory, 
number theory and cryptography that will be used in 
subsequent chapters. Readers interested in the theory 
of cryptography will find Oded Goldreich's book “ Foun-
dations of Cryptography" [18] and Wenbo Mao's book 
"Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice" [25] help-
ful. 
2.1 Complexity Theory 
Let A be an algorithm. By 乂(.）(resp. 乂(.，...，•)）we denote 
that A has one input (resp. several inputs), y — A{x) denotes 
5 
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that y was obtained from algorithm A on input x. 
In complexity theory, problems are classified by the most ef-
ficient algorithm that solve them. Efficiency of an algorithm is 
measured by the resources required to solve the problem. Time 
complexity (resp. space complexity) of an algorithm refers to 
the number of primitive steps (resp. memory) required to solve 
the problem. 
Standard asymptotic notation is used to compare running 
time of algorithms. By / (n ) = 0{g{n)) we denote that there 
exists some positive constants c, no such that for all n > no, 
0 < f{n) < cg{n). That is, f is bounded asymptotically by 
g. If g{n) = 0{f{n) holds, then / (n ) = n(g(n)). Further 
more, if f(n) = 0(g(n)) and g(n) = 0(f(n)), then we write 
f(n) = 0(g(n)). On the other hand, f(n) = o(g(n)) means 
that the upper-bound is not asymptotically tight. That is, for 
any positive constant c, there exists an integer tiq such that 
0 < / (n ) < cg{n) for all n > Uq. 
Let A be an algorithm with running time of A being 0(exp(c+ 
for some positive constant c, a, satisfying 0 < 
a < 1 with respect to input size n. We say that A is polynomial-
time if Q； = 0, exponential-time if a = 1 and sub-exponential 
time otherwise. 
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2.2 Algebra and Number Theory 
Number theory plays an important role in public key cryptog-
raphy. We review some of the basic facts that shall be used in 
subsequent sections. 
2.2.1 Groups 
A group is a non-empty set S together with a binary operation 
* that maps 5 x 5 to 5 satisfying the following properties. 
• Associative: {a ^h) ^ c = a ^ {h ^  c) Va,b,c e S 
• Existence of Identity: 3u G S s.t. 冬 u = u 本 a = a 
• Existence of Inverse: Va G 5, 36 G 5 s.t. a ^ b = u e S. b 
is called the inverse of a 
In addition, if a * 6 = 6 * aVa, 6 G 5, then it is called a com-
mutative (or abelian) group. If the binary operation is called 
addition (denoted by + ) ’ the identity element is denoted by 0 
and inverse element of a is denoted by -a. On the other hand, 
if the operation is multiplication, the inverse of a is denoted by 
1/a or a—i. We use the notation a几 for element a multiplying 
itself n times and to denote element a—i multiply itself by 
n times. 
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Let G be a group. denotes the number of elements G. G 
is finite if \G\ is finite and G is cyclic \i 3g ^ G s.t. \/a e G 
3x e Z s.t. a = g工,g is called generator of G and we can write 
{g) = G. The order of an element a, denoted by ord(a), is the 
smallest positive integer n such that a" 二 1. A group H is said 
to be a subgroup of another group G, denoted hy H C G, if H 
and G shares the same binary operation and \/a e H,a e G. 
2.2.2 Additive Group Z^ and Multiplicative Group Z* 
One important group in cryptography is the set of integers mod-
ulo n together with addition modulo n. This group, denoted by 
Zn, is abelian. Another important group Z* is formed by the 
set of positive integers smaller than n and relatively prime to n 
with multiplication modulo n. It is obvious that = n and 
Z* I = (j){n) where the Euler totient function is defined as 
follow. 
Definition 2.1. The Euler totient function 0(n) for any positive 
integer n is (j){n) = |{a|l < a < n, gcd{a, n) = 1 } . 
For n = where Pi are the prime factors of n, (j){n) 
can be computed by 
<t>{n) = n\{(l-llvi) 
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We have the following theorems regarding 
Theorem 2.2 (Euler's Totient Theorem). 
… = 1 mod n 
for all a relatively prime to n. 
In particular, if n is a prime number, we have the Fermat's 
Little Theorem. 
Theorem 2.3 (Fermat's Little Theorem). 
a^-i = 1 mod n 
for all n \ a where n is prime. 
2.2.3 The Integer Factorization Problem 
The security of many cryptosystems, such as RSA[37], Rabin[35], 
to name a few, relies on the hardness of the integer factorization 
problem. We first describe when we consider a problem to be 
hard in an rather informal manner in the following definition. 
For a more formal treatment, see [25 . 
Definition 2.4. A problem is said to be easy when there exists 
an algorithm that solves the problem with running time that is 
polynomial in size of the input. A problem is hard when no such 
algorithm exists. 
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Definition 2.5 (Integer Factorization Problem). Given a 
positive integer n, find its prime factorization. That is, write 
n = • •.where the pi are pairwise distinct primes and 
I 
Some algorithms are tailored to perform better for n of special 
format. These algorithms, including trail division, Pollard's rho 
algorithm, Pollard's p-1 and the elliptic curve algorithm, are 
known as special-purpose factoring algorithm. In contrast, the 
running time of the general-purpose factoring algorithm depends 
only on the size of n. Examples of these types of algorithms 
includes quadratic sieve and general number field sieve. 
If a large prime n is the product of two primes which are 
roughly of the same size, no algorithms are known that can 
factor in polynomial time. However, sub-exponential time algo-
rithm exists. For example, the number field sieve algorithm[24 
has a time complexity of 0(exp(1.92 + o(l)(lnn)i/3(inlnn)2/3)). 
Definition 2.6 (Computing Square Roots Problem). Let 
n be a composite number. Given y, find x s.t. x^ = y mod n, 
providing that such x exists. 
The integer factorization problem is equivalent to the prob-
lem of computing square root. That is, suppose we have polynomial-
time algorithm which can solve the integer factorization prob-
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lem, we can use it to construct an algorithm which can solve 
the computing square roots problem and vice versa. In fact, the 
Rabin public key encryption schemes uses this computational 
equivalence to achieve the first "provably secure" encryption 
scheme. 
2.2.4 Quadratic Residuosity Problem 
Definition 2.7 (Quadratic Residue). An element a e is 
a quadratic residue modulo n if 3x such that x^ = a mod n. If 
there exist no such x E Z^； a is called a quadratic non-residue. 
The set of all quadratic residues and the set of all non-residues 
are denoted by QRn and QNRn respectively. 
We uses the Legendre symbol to keep track of whether or not 
an integer is a quadratic residue modulo a prime number. 
Definition 2.8 (Legendre Symbol). Let p be an odd prime 
number and a an integer. The legendre symbol, denoted by (芸)， 
is defined to he 0 if p\a, I if a e QRn and -1 if a e QNRn 
respectively. 
We can generalize Legendre symbol for integer n which may 
not be odd prime as follow. 
Definition 2.9 (Jacobi Symbol). Let n he an integer greater 
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than 3 with prime factorization .. and a be an inte-
ger. The Jacohi symbol, denoted by (^), is defined as follow: 
{-) = { - n - r •" i - r 
n Pi P2 Pk 
It is worth noting that (^) = 1 does not imply a is a quadratic 
residue modulo n. (^) can be computed efficiently[11] without 
factorization of n. We define Jn = {a ^ ^nl(n “ 
We are now ready to define the quadric residuosity problem 
(QRP) which is to decide if an integer is a quadratic residue 
modulo n. The security of Goldwasser-Micali probabilistic public-
key encryption scheme[19] relies on this problem. 
Definition 2.10 (QRP). Given an odd positive composite inte-
ger n and a G J^, decide whether or not a is a quadratic residue 
modulo n. 
It is obvious that if we can solve the integer factorization 
problem, QRP can be solved efficiently. On the other hand, no 
algorithm, other than random guessing, is known to solve QRP. 
If n = pq, then the probability of guessing correctly is 1/2. It is 
believed that QRP is as hard as factorization[27], although no 
proof of this is known. 
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2.2.5 Computing e-th Roots (The RSA Problem) 
The hardness of the RSA problem is the basis of the RSA[37 
encryption and signature scheme and many other schemes. 
Definition 2.11. Given n = pq, where p and q are odd primes, 
and e such that gcd(e,(j){n))=1, and an integer c, find an inte-
ger m such that rrf = c mod n. n and e are sometimes called 
modulus and exponent respectively. 
If integer factorization is easy, then so is the RSA problem. 
Whether the converse is also true is not known. We shall denote 
the RSA problem with modulus n and exponent e by RSA[n,e . 
2.2.6 Discrete Logarithm and Related Problems 
The hardness of discrete logarithm problem is the basis of many 
crypt osystems. 
Definition 2.12. Let G be a finite cyclic group of order n and 
g G G be a generator of G. The discrete logarithm problem 
(DLP) is define as follow. Given an element y ^ G, find the 
integer x, Q < x <\G\ — 1, such that y 二 g工 holds, x is denoted 
by log“y). 
The generalized discrete logarithm problem is that given a 
finite group G (not necessarily cyclic), two elements y,h in G, 
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find X such that y = h工 provided such x exists. Just as the case 
for integer factorization, we shall briefly talk about algorithm 
that solves DLP. These algorithms can be categorized into the 
following three categroies. 
• Generic Algorithms. The algorithms in this category do 
not use the properties of the underlying group besides mul-
tiplication, inversion and unique encoding of the group el-
ements. Examples include Shanks' Baby-Step Giant-Step 
method[22], Pollard's rho met hod [34]. A result of Shoup[40' 
stated that any generic methods takes at least O ( v ^ ) op-
erations to solve DLP, where n is the order of the group. 
Therefore, generic algorithms must be exponential in the 
size of the input. 
• Algorithms which work in arbitrary groups but are espe-
cially efficient if the order of the group has only small prime 
factors. An Example is the Pohling-Hellman algorithm[33:. 
• Special algorithms that exploit the representation of the 
group elements. The algorithms in this category work only 
in the group they were designed for. An example is the 
Number Field Sieve[41] for the group Z*, where p is prime. 
Running time of Number Field Sieve is 
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0(exp((1.92 + o(l))(lnp)i/3(lnlnp)2/3)). 
We would like to point out that hardness of DLP depends 
strongly on the representation of the elements of the group. 
Groups on which no attacks other than generic ones are suit-
able for the design of DL-based cryptographic protocols. 
Closely related to the discrete logarithm problem is the com-
putational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH). 
Definition 2.13 (Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem). 
Given a finite cyclic group G, a generator g, two elements g°', 
g\ find 
Obviously, CDH is no harder than DLP. For some groups, 
CDH and DLP are shown to be computationally equivalent [26 . 
Besides the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, there ex-
ists a weaker version called the decision Diffie-Hellman problem 
(DDH), introduced in [7:. 
Definition 2.14 (Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem). Given 
a finite cyclic group G, a generator g, three elements g\ gb, g � 
decide whether g^ = 
It is obvious that DDH is no harder than CDH. For most 
groups it is not clear whether DDH is easier than CDH. Certain 
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groups with the property that CDH is hard and DDH is easy 
are called Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) groups. 
2.3 Public key Cryptography 
In public key cryptography, also known as asymmetric cryptog-
raphy, each user has a key pair consisting of a public key and 
a secret key such that given the public key, it is hard to de-
rive the secret key. This is in contrast with secret key cryptog-
raphy, also known as symmetric cryptography or conventional 
cryptography, in which there is only a single key or the encryp-
tion/decryption key pair can be derived from each other easily. 
Symmetric key encryption schemes have been known for ages. 
Commonly used symmetric-key encryptions include Data En-
cryption Standard (DES), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), 
IDEA, etc. They are efficient and secure, provided that the en-
cryption /decryption key is unknown to adversary. However, the 
problem of symmetric key encryption schemes is that it is dif-
ficult to find an efficient way for two parties to exchange the 
secret key securely. 
Public key cryptography was only invented in 1977 by Diffie 
and Hellman[14]. In public key cryptography, each user U has 
a key pair {pk, sk) consisting of a public key and a secret key. 
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Given pk, it is computationally hard to find sk. In an encryption 
scheme, other parties uses ITs public key pk to encrypt message 
for U. Only U, who know the secret key sk, can decrypt the 
message. The development of public-key cryptography is consid-
ered a revolution in cryptography: while the key for conventional 
cryptography must be exchanged securely, the public key only 
need to be exchanged authentically. 
Public key cryptography also make it possible to realize the 
digital counterpart of handwritten signature: digital signature 
for electronic files. 
2.3.1 Encryption 
As mentioned before, each user in an a public key encryption 
scheme possess a key pair. In fact, a public key encryption 
scheme is a oneway trapdoor function f with trapdoor infor-
mation t. A oneway trapdoor function is some function that is 
easy to compute but hard to invert without the trapdoor infor-
mation. The idea is that f is used as the public key, and t is use 
as the secret key. Suppose Bob wants to encrypt a message m 
to Alice with public key / , Bob computes ciphertext c = f{m) 
and transmit c to Alice. Alice decrypt by computer m = 
using her trapdoor information t. Only Alice can do so because 
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of the oneway trapdoor property of f . 
Formally speaking, an encryption scheme 五 is a 3-tuple 
(Keygen, Encrypt, Decrypt). Keygen takes security parameter A 
to output {pk^sk) where pk is a public key and sk is a secret 
key. We write {pk, sk) <— Keygen(1^). The encryption algo-
rithm Encrypt output a ciphertext c on input message m and 
public key pk] we write c <— Encryptp^(m). The decryption 
algorithm Decrypt output message m or reject on input cipher-
text c and secret key sk; we write x <— Decryptgj^(c), where x 
can be m or reject. We required that V(pk, sk) Keygen(1^), 
Decryptg^(Encrypt^^(m)) = m for all message m. Keygen, En-
crypt, Decryptare all polynomial time algorithms. 
There are several concepts of security in public-key encryp-
tion. The most basic one being one-way secure which means 
that given a ciphertext, no polynomial time adversary should 
be able to obtain the plaintext m from the given ciphertext. 
This security is called OW-CPA. We are going to consider se-
mantic security and chosen ciphertext security here. That latter 
is sufficiently strong for most applications and is thus and ac-
ceptable notion of security for public key encryption schemes. 
For a detailed description of security notions, refer to [1 . 
We say that a public key encryption scheme E is semantic 
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES 19 
secure against chosen plaintext attack if it is hard to find any 
(partial) information on message m from ciphertext c. This 
notion is closely related to indistinguishability against chosen 
plaintext attack (IND-CPA), which is described as follows. 
For IND-CPA security, we consider a game between the dealer 
and an adversary. Suppose the dealer gives an adversary a ran-
dom public key. The adversary then comes up with two mes-
sages. The dealer chooses one of which randomly and encrypted 
it as a challenge (gauntlet) ciphertext. If the adversary correctly 
guesses which one, he wins the game. An encryption scheme is 
said to be IND-CPA secure if no polynomial time adversary can 
win the game with probability non-negligibly more than a half. 
For chosen ciphertext security, we consider a similar game. 
Only this time, the adversary is allowed to issue a number of 
decryption queries to the dealer. We say the adversary is given 
access to the decryption oracle. That is, the adversary present 
a ciphertext of his choice to the dealer and the dealer responds 
with the decryption of that ciphertext under the secret key cor-
responding to the public key given to the adversary. Of course, 
the adversary is not allowed to query the gauntlet ciphertext. A 
public key encryption scheme is said to be IND-CCA2 secure if 
no polynomial time adversary can win the game with probability 
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non-negligibly more than a half. Intuitively, IND-CCA2 security 
means that even if the adversary has access to the decryptions 
of a number of his choice, he still cannot learn anything about 
the plaintext of a given ciphertext. 
2.3.2 Digital Signature 
Digital signature scheme is the analogue of handwritten signa-
ture. Intuitively, a digital signature must be hard to forge and 
easy for everyone to verify. A digital signature is in essence a 
bit string that related the message to the signer's public key. 
Formally speaking, a digital signature scheme 5 is a 3-tuple 
(Keygen, Sign, Verify). Keygen takes security parameter A to out-
put {pk,sk) where pk is a public key and sk is a secret key. We 
write {pk, sk) — Keygen(l^). The signing algorithm Sign out-
put a signature a on input message m and secret key sk] we 
write a — S\gngj^ {m). The verification algorithm Verify output 
0 or 1 on input message m, signature a and public key pk] we 
write X — Verify�左(cr, m), where x can be 0 or 1. We required 
that V(p/c, sk) <r- Keygen(lA)，Verifypjt(Signs/j(m)’ m) = 1 for all 
message m. In addition, it is required that a signature scheme 
must be unforgeable. This means that is must be infeasible to 
compute a signature of a message with respect to a public key 
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without knowing the corresponding secret key. Keygen, Sign, 
Verify are all polynomial time algorithms. 
The acceptable notion of security for digital signature scheme 
is existential unforgeability against chosen message attack (uf-
cma). We consider a game between the dealer and an adversary 
as follow. The dealer gives an adversary a random public key. 
The adversary is allowed to issue a number of signing queries to 
the dealer. We say the adversary is given access to the signing 
oracle. That is, the adversary present a message of his choice to 
the dealer and the dealer responds with a valid signature of that 
message corresponding to the public key given to the adversary. 
The adversary wins the game if he could deliver a valid signa-
ture and message pair under the public key given by the dealer. 
Of course, the adversary is not allowed to submit message that 
has been queried to the dealer for signature. A digital signa-
ture scheme is said to be uf-cma secure if no polynomial time 
adversary can win the game with probability non-negligibly. In-
tuitively, uf-cma security means that even if the adversary has 
access to the signer for a number of message of his choice, he 
still cannot forge a new signature that the signer has not signed. 
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2.3.3 Identification Protocol 
An identification protocol allows a prover Peggy to convince a 
verifier Victor of her identity. Victor is given the public key 
belongs to Peggy. If someone could prove to Victor that she 
knows the secret key corresponding to the Peggy's public key, 
Victor can concluded that this entity must be Peggy. 
Informally speaking, an identification protocols (sometimes 
known as standard identification protocols SI) is a 3-tuple (Keygen, 
Prover, Verifier). Keygen takes security parameter 入 to output 
(pk,sk) where pk is a public key and sk is a secret key. We write 
{pk, sk) Keygen(1^). (Prover, Verifier) is an interactive pro-
tocol for prover Peggy and verifier Victor. The protocol must 
satisfy three properties. 
• Completeness. Peggy, knowing the secret key, must be able 
to convince Victor for his identity. 
• Soundness. Entity not knowing the secret key must not be 
able to convince Victor that she is Peggy. 
• Zero-knowledgeness. Victor should not be able to learn 
anything about Peggy's secret key. 
In this dissertation, we only consider three-move identifica-
tion protocols, commonly known as canonical. It means that the 
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interactive protocol between (Prover, Verifier) is of the following 
form. 
1. Prover sends a commitment t to Verifier. 
2. Verifier returns a challenge c which is randomly chosen from 
some set. 
3. Prover provides a response z. 
4. Based on the input (p/c, i, c, z), Verifier output Accept or 
Reject. 
Identification protocol should be secure against imperson-
ation. An adversary succeeds in an impersonation attack if it 
interacts with the verifier in the role of a prover and can con-
vince the verifier to accept. We consider three types of attackers, 
namely, passive, active and concurrent attacker. We consider the 
following two-phase game between the dealer and the adversary. 
In phase I, adversary is given a random public key for imperson-
ation. Adversary is allowed to make some transcript query (for 
passive attack) or request to act as a (cheating) verifier (for ac-
tive and concurrent attack). For transcript query, dealer return 
a complete communication transcript between a prover and veri-
fier. The difference between active and concurrent attack is that 
in the former case, request for being (cheating) verifier must be 
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sequential. An identification protocol is imp-atk-secure, where 
atk6{pa,aa,ca} if it is secure against impersonation under pas-
sive, active or concurrent attack. That is, no polynomial time 
adversary can win in the above game. 
Identification protocol can be used to construct digital signa-
ture schemes by the Fiat-Shamir transform[15]. For such con-
structions, it is often argued that the resulting signature scheme 
is uf-cma secure if the underlying identification protocol is imp-
pa-secure and a secure one-way hash function is used. The re-
sulting signature scheme is said to be secure in the random oracle 
model [3 . 
2.3.4 Hash Function 
A hash function H is a transformation that takes a variable-
size input m and returns a fixed-size string, which is called the 
hash value h (that is, h = H{m)). Usually, it has to be easily 
computable. 
Hash functions employed in cryptography have at least one 
of the following properties. 
• one-way. For a given /i, it is difficult to find x such that 
H{x) = c 
• weak collision resistant. For a given x, it is hard to find an 
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^x s.t. H(x) = H{x') 
• strong collision resistant. It is hard to find a pair {x,x'), 
X + x', such that E{x) = E(x') 
In digital signature schemes, hash function can be used to 
reduce message size. It can also be used to turn interactive 
proofs of knowledge protocols into digital signature schemes by 
taking the place of the verifier. Currently MD5 and SHA-1 
are most popular choice of hash functions. Recently, collision of 
MD5 has been found [21]. A Chinese research team also claimed 
that SHA-1 is vulnerable and they have developed algorithm to 
find collision for full SHA-l(whose output is 160 bit) with 
calculations. Their result has not been published yet at the 
moment. We will not discuss the issue in further detail in this 
thesis. 




This chapter introduces Paillier Cryptosystem [32]. Sev-
eral relevant schemes are also outlined. This chapter 
provides building blocks for the identification schemes 
described in the next chapters. 
3.1 Introduction 
Goldwasser and Micali started the work on trapdoor mecha-
nism based on quadratic residuosity [19] in 1984. Their scheme, 
however, is bandwidth inefficient. Benaloh and Fischer[12] uses 
higher order resides to improve the bandwidth efficiency but the 
decryption is inefficient. In 1998, Naccache and Stern[29] pro-
26 
CHAPTER 3. PAILLIER CRYPTOSYSTEMS 27 
posed a variant of the Benaloh-Fischer scheme with better band-
width efficiency. Their scheme make use of residuosity of smooth 
degree in Z*^. At the same time, Okamoto and Uchiyama[31 
proposed to use residuosity of prime degree p in the group 
The scheme has similar bandwidth efficiency as Naccache-Stern 
but with improved decryption efficiency. 
In 1999, Paillier[32] brought re-vigored interests to this trap-
door mechanism in the group of II种.Since then, it has found 
uses in verifiable encryption [9] and double trapdoor decryption[8 . 
Several variants of Paillier's cryptosystem have been proposed 
recently [10, 17 . 
3.2 The Paillier Cryptosystem 
Let n = pg be an RSA modulus and g an element having order 
an with a > 1 in the multiplicative group Z*2. To encrypt a 
message m e Z*2, Paillier proposed the following mechanism. 
(mi, 7712) i-» g饥im2几 mod 
where m = mi + nv^N and he proved that: 
• is a bijection between Z^ x Z* and Z*2. 
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• £g is a one-way trapdoor permutation equivalent to RSA[n,n 
• the above is one-way if and only if RSA[n,n] is hard. 
For any w G Z*2, there exists unique {x,y) € (Z^, Z*) such 
that w = £g(cc,y). Paillier called x the class of w relative to 
g(denoted by [ti；]^) and informally, computing [w]g given w and g 
is called the computational composite residuosity class problem. 
If w e< g >, computing [w]g is called partial discrete logarithm 
problem (PDL). Paillier assume both of them are hard. Note 
also that inverting Sg is equivalent to RSA[n,n]. We also have 
the following definition with regard to class. 
Definition 3.1 (Decisional Composite Residuosity Class 
Assumption (D-Class) [32]). Given prime product n, and 
W e Z*2, r e ILn, it is infeasible to decide with probability over 
random guessing, in polynomial time, if there exists y G Z* such 
that W = {1 + n)Y"(modn2). 
Given c = g^y^ mod n?, x, y can be found as follow. Define 
L{u) = {u — l)/n 
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Then compute, 
I = 1cm (p, q) 
X = (L(c^ mod mod n^)) mod n 
y = ( c r ” � - i m � d / m o d n 
We outline several Paillier-related encryption schemes. De-
note (c, m) as (ciphertext, plaintext) pair. Denote r as random 
number from Z^. 
CATALANO, ET A L . [ 1 0 ] . C = mod where (e,入(n))= 
1. Its one-wayness is reducible to R S A [ n , e . 
GALINDO, ET AL . [17]. c = r^ ® + mn mod n\ where (e,入(n))= 
1. Its one-wayness is reducible to factorization (n = pq^ V — <1 — 
3 mod 4). 
KUROSAWA ET AL. [ 2 3 ] . c = (r + a/r)® + mn(modn^), where 
e is a prime between n/2 to n and {a/p) 二（a/g) = —1. Its one-
wayness is reducible to factorization. In all these encryption 
scheme, the randomness r is recovered during decryption. 




The idea of Identity-based (ID-based) cryptography was 
proposed by Shamir[39] in 1984. In this new paradigm, 
users' identifying information such as email or IP ad-
dress can be used as public key for encryption, signature 
or identification. ID-based cryptography avoid the need 
to link users to their public keys. Thus, it reduces sys-
tem complexity and the cost for establishing and man-
aging the public key authentication framework known 
as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). In this chapter, we 
describe ID-based cryptography and review related re-
sults. 
30 
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4.1 Introduction 
In 1984, Shamir suggested a new idea for public key encryp-
tion scheme in which the public key can be an arbitrary string. 
The original motivation for such a scheme was to simplify cer-
tificate management. Since then several identity-based signa-
ture (IBS) and identity-based identification (IBI) schemes have 
been proposed. These include the Fiat-Shamir scheme [15], 
the schemes included in Shamir's paper introducing identity-
bsaed cryptosystem[39], the Guillou-Quisquater scheme[20] and 
T. Okamoto scheme [30]. [2] provide detailed analysis on 14 
existing IBI and IBS by providing a framework that reduces 
proving security of IBI and IBS schemes to proving security of 
an underlying SI scheme. 
On the other hand, efficient Identity-based encryption (IBE) 
scheme did not appear until 2001, when Boneh and Franklin[6 
proposed an IBE based on the bilinear Diffie-Hellman prob-
lem with respect to a pairing, such as the Weil pairing, and 
Cocks[ll] based on the quadratic residuosity problem. Boneh 
and Franklin's scheme is considered much more efficient, and 
since then ID-based cryptography has been a very popular re-
search topic. 
Boneh and Franklin's scheme is secured in the random oracle 
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model. Later, Canetti et. al. [36] describe a weaker model of 
security for IBE that they called the Selective-ID model. They 
proposed an IBE that is secure in this model without using the 
random oracle methodology. Boneh and Boyen [4] improve upon 
this result by describing an efficient scheme that is secure in the 
Selective-ID model. Recently, Boneh and Boyen [5] proposed 
another scheme that is fully secure without random oracles. Fi-
nally, a more efficient scheme is proposed by Waters[43 . 
4.2 Identity-based Encryption 
An IBE is a four-tuple (setup,extract,encrypt,decrypt), setup 
takes security parameter 入 to output system parameters pa ram 
and master key pair master key. extract takes param, masterkey, 
and ID G {0，1}*，to output a user private key d. encrypt takes 
param, ID, and message M to output ciphertext C. decrypt 
takes param, C, private key d, to output message M. [6] defined 
semantic security of IBE as a form of IND-CPA security of the 
encryption system. 
4.2.1 Notions of Security 
Chosen Ciphertext Security. An identity-based encryption 
scheme S is semantically secure against an adaptive chosen ci-
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phertext attack (IND-ID-CCA) if no polynomially bounded ad-
versary A has a non-negligible advantage against the Challenger 
in the following IND-ID-CCA game: 
Setup; The challenger takes a security parameter \ and runs 
the Setup algorithm. It gives the adversary the resulting 
system parameters params. It keeps the master-key to itself. 
Phase 1: The adversary issues queries …qm where query qi 
is one of: 
• Extraction query (IDi). The challenger responds by 
running algorithm Extract to generate the private key 
di corresponding to the public key (IDj). It sends di to 
the adversary. 
• Decryption query (IDj, Ci). The challenger responds by-
running algorithm Extract to generate the private key 
di corresponding to ID .^ It then runs algorithm Decrypt 
to decrypt the ciphertext Q using the private key di. 
It sends the resulting plaintext to the adversary. 
These queries may be asked adaptively, that is, each query 
Qi may depend on the replies to qi . . .qi. 
Challenge (Gaunt let): Once the adversary decides that Phase 
1 is over it outputs two equal length plaintexts MQ, Mi e M 
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and an identity ID on which it wishes to be challenged. The 
only constraint is that ID did not appear in any private key 
extraction query in Phase 1. The challenger picks a random 
bit b E {0 ,1 } and sets C 二 Encrypt(params’ ID, Mb). It 
sends C as the challenge to the adversary. 
Phase 2: The adversary issues more queries gVn+i’ …，QVi where 
query qi is one of: 
• Extraction query (ID) where IDj + ID. Challenger re-
sponds as in Phase 1. 
• Decryption query {\Di,Ci) * {ID,C). Challenger re-
sponds as in Phase 1. 
These queries may be asked adaptively as in Phase 1. 
Guess: Finally, the adversary outputs a guess M G {0 ,1} . The 
adversary wins the game if 二 
We refer to such an adversary A as an IND-ID-CCA adversary. 
We define adversary 乂，s advantage in attacking the scheme S 
as the following function of the security parameter 入（入 is given 
as input to the challenger): Advs^A{k) 二 I^Mb 二 的一臺U s i n g 
the IND-ID-CCA game we can define chosen ciphertext security 
for IBE schemes. 
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Definition 4.1. An IBE system 8 is semantically secure against 
an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack if for any polynomial time 
IND-ID-CCA adversary A the function Advs^Ai^) is negligible. 
As shorthand, we say that S is IND-ID-CCA secure. 
Note that the security requirements of an IBE was first form-
lized by Bohen and Franklin [6]. Interested readers may refered 
to the paper for detailed description. 
4.2.2 Related Results 
We review the IBE from Cocks [11 . 
• Setup. Generate two primes p and q, such that p = q = 
3 mod 4，compute N = pq. {mpk.msk) = ((n), (p, q)). 
Define a hash function Hi : {0,1}* — ILn 
• Extract. Compute Q = Hi{- • • ( F i ( I D ) . . . ) ’ where hash-
ing Hi is applied repeatedly until the first result whose 
Jacobi symbol equals 1. Either Q or -Q is in QRn- Com-
pute r such that r^ = Q oi r'^ = -Q. The user secret key 
is r. 
• Encrypt. Message m £ { - 1 , + 1 } : Choose t,t, G Zn with 
= (•) = m. Send c = (t + Q/^)(modn) and c , = 
— Q/t'){modn). as the ciphertext. 
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• Decrypt, Message m jf q ^ QR^ and m = 
c'+2r mod n\ 
n ) 
The scheme is IND-CPA-secure if quadratic residuosity prob-
lem is hard. 
4.3 Identity-based Identification 
An IBI scheme is a tuple XB:Z:=(Mkg, UKg, P, V). Mkg takes 
in security parameter A and return master public and secret 
key pair (mpk^msk). Ukg on input msk, and an identity I, 
output user secret key usk. In the interactive identification pro-
tocol, P(initialized with usk, I) interact with V(initialized with 
/, mpk). The protocol ends when V either accept or reject. [2 
defined an IBI is imp-atk-secure, where atk G {pa, aa, ca} if it is 
secure against impersonation under passive, active or concurrent 
attack. 
In this dissertation, we only consider three-move identifica-
tion protocol of the following form. 
1. P sends a commitment t to V. 
2. V returns a challenge c which is randomly chosen from some 
set. 
3. P provides a response z. 
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4. Based on the input (mpk, c, z), V output Accept or Re-
ject. 
4.3.1 Security notions 
We consider three types of impersonation attack, namely, pas-
sive, active and concurrent attack, in the following game. 
To model the attack scenario, we provide the adversary with 
the following oracles. 
• JCSO. On input ID, output usk for the corresponding ID. 
• CO. On input ID, output a conversation transcript of the 
interactive protocol between P, V) for that identity. 
• VO (Prover Oracle). On input ID, act as the prover P to 
carry out the interactive identification protocol. 
Game IB-IMP 
1. Setup Phase: Dealer V runs Mkg(l^) to obtain {mpk,msk). 
2. Probe Phase: Adversary A issue queries to the oracles. The 
queries can be interleaved. 
3. At some point, A chooses a gauntlet ID, ID^ on which it 
wishes to impersonate and A act as the cheating prover 
now, trying to convince the verifier 
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The following restrictions applied. Passive attacker cannot 
query VO. Active attacker can query VO only in a sequential 
manner. A wins the game if it can successfully convince the 
verifier and IDG has never been input of K £ 0 . 
Definition 4.2. An ID-based identification scheme is ib-atk-
imp-secure (atk G {pa, aa, ca] which stands for passive, active 
and concurrent) if no polynomial time adversary can win the 
above game with non-negligible probability. 
For detailed description of the security model for IBI, readers 
are recommended to [2 . 
4.4 Identity-based Signature 
An ID-based signature (IBS) scheme is a four-tuple (Mkg, Ukg, 
IBSS, IBSV) specified as follow. Mkg, Ukg are the same as 
IBI. (a) <— \BSS(ID, mpk,usk,m) is a PPT algorithm which, 
on input ID, mpk, usk and message m, generate a signature 
a. Accept/Reject IBSV {ID, mpk, m, a) is a PPT algorithm 
which, on input ID, signature a, message m, output Accept or 
Reject. 
An IBS should satisfy two properties, namely, completeness 
and soundness. 
CHAPTER 4. IDENTITY-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY 39 
(Completeness.) A legitimate signature should be accepted. 
Formally, for all security parameter 入 and VID G {0,1}*, (mpk, msk) E 
•Mkg(l^)], and usk G [Ukg(ID, mpk^ ms/c)], Accept <~ IBSV(ID, mpk, m, cr) 
with overwhelming probability if cr 卜 IBSS(ID, mpk^ usk^ m). 
(Soundness.) An invalid signature should be rejected. For-
mally, for all security parameter A and VID e {0，1}*’ (mp/c, msk) G 
Mkg(l^)], and usk E [Ukg(ID, mp/c, msA:)], Reject — IBSV(ID, mpA:, m, cr) 
with overwhelming probability if cr IBSS(ID, mpk^ usk^ m). 
4.4.1 Security notions 
The accepted security notion for IBS is existential unforgeability 
against adaptive chosen ID and message attack (ib-uf-cma). We 
consider the following game. 
To model the attack scenario, we provide the adversary with 
the following oracles. 
• KLSO defined before. 
• Signing Oracle (SO )\ a — SO{lD,mpk,m). Upon inputs 
ID G { ID} , mpk and message m, output a signature a such 
that Accept IBSV(ID, mpk, m, a). 
Game I B - U F - C M A 
1. Setup Phase: Dealer V runs Mkg(l入）to obtain {mpk, msk). 
CHAPTER 4. IDENTITY-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY 40 
2. Probe Phase: Adversary A issue queries to the oracles. At 
some point, A chooses a gauntlet ID, IDG, to forge a sig-
nature with on any message of its choice. A cannot submit 
IDG to JCSO and it must be returned from lO. 
3. Delivery Phase: At the end, A submit a signature a for 
message m of ID^. m and IDq pair must not be submit-
ted to SO before. V outputs either Accept (if Accept 卜 
IBSV(ID, mpk, m, a)) or Reject (otherwise). 
The advantage of adversary is defined as the probability that 
Dealer output Accept. 
Definition 4.3. An IBS scheme (Mkg, Ukg, IBSS, IBSV) is uf-
cma-secure if no PPT adversary has non-negligible advantage in 
Game IB-UF-CMA. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 5 
Identity-Based Cryptography 
from Paillier System 
Summary 
In this chapter, we present several identity-based identi-
fication (IBI) schemes in the Paillier setting, and reduce 
their security to RSA-related assumptions in the random 
oracle model. The Fiat-Shamir paradigm can be used 
to turn them to identity-based signature (IBS) schemes. 
Next, we reformat Cocks'[11] IBE in the Paillier setting. 
41 
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5.1 Identity-based Identification schemes in 
Paillier setting 
In schemes below, hash function H mapping arbitrary string to 
random element of QR^i is used. However, in practice, how it 
can be implemented is unclear since deciding whether an element 
is a quadratic residue is hard without factorization. We adapt 
the technique by Cocks [11]. Hc{-.. {Hc{seed)...) = w mod n? 
until the hash output has Jacobi Symbol equal to 1. Note Jacobi 
Symbol can be computed without knowing the factoring of n. 
By our setting, either w or —w is in QRn^. 
5.1.1 Paillier-IBI 
We present Paillerl,2-IBI, motivated by [32 . 
MKg: Generate two safe primes p and q, compute n = pq. 
Generate g of order an where a is any integer. (mp/c,ms/c)=((n,g),(p,q)). 
UKg: For identity I, denote Q = H{I), compute {x,y) e 
(Zn X QRn) such that g �孔= Q ( m o d n ^ ) . 
(P,V): (Commit, challenge, response)二(力,c, 2;) where t = 
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G�gV mod n^) , for randomly generated r and u. c is ran-
dom challenge, z = (2^ 1,2:2) = (r — cx,uy~^) G (Z x Z*). Verify 
t =外 Qcf z2lmodn2)). 
In paillierl-IBI, 0 is the identity mapping while in Paillier2-IBI, 
9 is the random oracle. 
Theorem 5.1. Paillierl-IBI is imp-pa-secure if the RSA[n,n] 
assumption holds, in the Random Oracle Model 
Theorem 5.2. Paillier2-IBI is imp-aa, ca-secure if the RSA[n’n] 
assumption holds, in the Random Oracle Model. 
We outline three other IBIs in Paillier setting below. 
5.1.2 C G G N - I B I 
We present CGGN1,2-IBI , motivated by the scheme from Cata-
lano et al.[10 . 
Key pairs: (mpk,msk):((ji,e),q)), where e is any public ex-
ponent relatively prime with (^(n). (uski)=(cc,y)G (Z^ x QRn) 
s.t. / / ( / ) = Q = (1 + n )工m o d n 2 ) . Also, denote by ^ = 1 + n. 
(P,V): (Commit, challenge, response)=(力’ c, 2;) where t = 
mod n^) , for randomly generated r and u. c is random 
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challenge < e. z = (2:1,2:2) = {r - cx, G (Z^ x Z*2). Verify 
t =…(jc 力 22e(modn2)). 
In CGGNl-IBI, 6 is the identity mapping while in CGGN2-IBI, 
9 is the random oracle. 
Theorem 5.3. CGHNl-IBI is imp-pa-secure if the RSA[n,e] 
assumption holds, in the Random Oracle Model. 
Theorem 5.4. CGHN2-IBI is imp-aa,ca-secure if the RSA[n,e] 
assumption holds, in the Random Oracle Model. 
5.1.3 G M M V - I B I 
GMMV-IBI is motivated by the scheme from Galindo, et al.[17:. 
Key pairs: {mpk,msk):{{n,e,K),{p,q)). {uski�=(^3:k)yk)6 [QRnX 
Zn) S.t. xf + VkTi = Hk{I) for /c = 1 ’ . . . ’ Denote Qk = Hk{I) 
for /c = 1，...， 
(P,V): (Commit, challenge, response)=(t, c, z) where t = 
(r2e + lin(modn^)) , for randomly generated r and u. c = 
( C i , … , c k ) is random binary vector challenge, z — (^1,^2)= 
( r n 工 r ' , 以 广 - E c m z f e ) e X Z , ) . Verify t = (1 + 
nY'zi^'YlQki^odn^) 
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Theorem 5.5. GMMV-IBI is imp-aa,ca-secure if Factorization 
is hard, in the Random Oracle Model 
5.1.4 KT- IBI 
KT-IBI is motivated by the scheme from Kurosawa et al.[23 . 
Key pairs: {mpk,msk):{Nwhere (a/p) = (a/q)= 
- 1 . 
{uski)={xk,yk)^ {QRn X Zn) s.t. Xk + a/xk + Vkn = HjJJ) for 
k = 1,... ,K. Denote Qk = Hk { I ) for k = 1 , . . . , X . Denote 
Ak = + Oi/xk and Bk = Xk - Oi/xk-
(P,V): (Commit, challenge, response)=(t, c, z) where t 二 r � . 
un(modn^) , for randomly generated r and u. c = ( c i , . . . , ck) 
is random binary vector, z =(之i，勾)={rYlB^^''-
E Ck2ykAkB-^) e (Z^2xZn). Verify t = ( 1 + n )幻之 [ ] {Ql - mod 
n2). 
Theorem 5.6. KT-IBI is imp-aa,ca-secure if Factorization is 
hard, in the Random Oracle Model 
Remarks: In using the Cocks technique, either H( / ) or -H( / ) 
is in QRn^. Prover should inform verifier which one is the case. 
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In the above protocols, we assume H(/) is the case. 
5.1.5 Choice of g for Paillier-IBI 
For Paillier 1,2-IBI, there are several choice of g for the relation 
((x,y),H(ID)) s.t. H{ID) = The only restriction 
is order of g has to be multiple of n. For the simplest case, 
g = 1 n whose order is n can be used. The response zi in the 
identification protocol can then be computed in Moreover, 
(1 + n ” = 1 + 2;n(modn^) and this improves efficiency. We can 
also have the choice such that p is a generator of QRn，, in which 
order of g is ncpiji), unknown to public. This choice would af-
fect the range of the randomly number during the identification 
protocol and is briefly explained as follow. 
Commit Randomly generate r G 芯[^ /4」，n G Z*, compute 
t 二 
Challenge. Randomly choose a challenge from Z^ ,^ where q� 
is a prime smaller than the smallest prime factor of n. 
Response. Compute zi = r — cx e Z and Z2 = uy~^{modn). 
Verify. Verify t = e{H{IDYg''Z2''{modn^)). 
In order to simulate the transcript, simulator first generate 
Zi from ，L几2/4�} and Z2 from Z^. Then it randomly gen-
erate c from Zgc and compute t = mod n?. To 
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prove the simulated transcript is indistinguishable from the ac-
tual transcript, one has to consider the probability distribution 
of the responses. For it is obvious that the two distribu-
tion are both uniform. Consider the probability distribution of 
Pzi(^i) of the responses of the prover and the probability dis-
tribution Pz[(^i) according the the way simulator chooses z[. 
Pz{(^i) is uniformly distributed across {0,...，L?^V4�}. It can 
be shown that the two distribution are indistinguishable if Qc is 
small enough. 
We have in mind if p, q are 512-bit, then Qc is 80 bit. 
5.2 Identity-based signatures from Paillier sys-
tem 
We can apply Fiat-Shamir transform [15] to the above IBI's and 
yield several IBS's. The resulting IBS's can be easily proven 
to be existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message 
attack {uf-cma-secure) under the corresponding assumptions of 
the IBI's. 
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5.3 Cocks ID-based Encryption in Paillier Set-
ting 
We reformat Cocks' IBE [11] in Paillier setting so that the same 
setting of keys can be used for both IBS and IBE. Its security 
is equivalent to the security of Cock's original IBE. 
Paillier-IBE 
Setup: Generate two safe primes p and q, compute n = pq, 
and an element g whose order is multiple of n. 
Extract: compute Q = H认…(ifi(ID)...), where hashing Hi 
is applied repeatedly until the first result whose Jacobi symbol 
equals 1. The secret key is {flag, x,y) where (Case 1) flag = 1， 
g工2/2n = Q, if Q e Q i ^ ; or (Case 2) flag 二 —1, g � = - Q , if 
-Q € QNRn. 
Encrypt: Message m e { - 1 , +1} : Choose t,t' e Zn with 
(^) 二 （€) = m. Randomly generate r,r'. Send c = + 
Q / 0 ( m o d n 2 ) and c' = g— {f — Q/力')(modn2). 
Decrypt: If flag = 1, then compute message=(c+2""打modn). 
Else, compute 
The following theorem can be proved easily. 
Theorem 5.7. Paillier-IBE is IB-OW-CPA secure if QRP Prob-
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lem is hard, in Random Oracle Model 
There are well-known methods to convert an OW-CPA en-
cryption to an IND-CCA encryption[3, 13, 32]. They can be 
used to convert Paillier-IBE to an IB-IND-CCA-secure IBE with 
multi-bit messages. We demonstrate by using 0AEP[3]. Let m 
be a multi-bit message, G and H be secure hashing functions. 
Randomly generate r. Let s = (m||0^ ) ® G{r), t = H{s) © r, 
ctxt be the bit-by-bit Paillier-IBE encryption of (s||t). Then the 
scheme is IB-IND-CCA secure in ROM, provided the padding 
length £ is sufficiently large. 
The particular conversion in Cocks [11] can also be used. But 
it comes without a formal proof of security. 
We make the observation that Paillier-IBE (resp. Cocks' 
IBE) can be used as an oblivious transfer (0T)[1Q]. In a 1-2 
OT, Alice sends Bob two messages, Bob receives at most one, 
and Alice does not know which one. In a chosen 1-2 OT[28], Bob 
gets to choose which one he receives. Paillier-IBE (resp. Cock's 
IBE) can be used as a chosen 1-2 OT as follows: Alice and Bob 
both know n, and Bob may know its factoring. Bob generates 
TT, (^) == 1, and sends it to Alice. Alice verifies (云）=1, then 
encrypts multi-bit message mo to the case TT G QR bit-by-bit, 
and she encrypts multi-bit message mi to the case - t t G QR 
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bit-by-bit, using Paillier-IBE (resp. Cocks' IBE). This is indeed 
a chosen 1-2 OT: Alice is assured Bob can only decrypt one 
message, but she does not know which one. But its bandwidth 
efficiency is poor. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 6 
Concluding Remarks 
We have presented 4 different IBI schemes from Paillier system 
and extended them to IBS. We reduce their securities to RSA 
or Factoring Problem, in the random oracle model. Finally, we 
present Cocks IBE in Paillier setting with some discussions. 
We recommend the following future research directions for 
this thesis. 
Secure IBI without random oracle model. So far all of the 
results presented in this thesis are proven secure only under 
the random oracle model. As with ID-based encryption 
scheme, research direction could be to construct scheme 
secured in the standard model. 
Extension to blind signature. Extension of the result to 
blind signature should be quite straight forward, especially 
51 
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for Paillierl-IBI. 
Extension to ring signature and linkable ring signature. 
Following the generic construction in [38], it is straight for-
ward to construct identity-based ring signature from our 
results. Trying to construct identity-based linkable ring 
signature may be possible by following the technique from 
42；. 
• End of chapter. 
Appendix A 
Proof of Theorems 
Summary 
Proofs of the theorems are given in this section. 
A . l Proof of Theorems 5.1, 5.2 
Proof of Theorem 5.1. 
Our argument goes as follow. Suppose Paillier 1-IBI is not imp-
pa-secure. Then there exists an impersonator X which can im-
personate the prover after observing a number of communication 
transcripts. We are going to show that if such X exists, then we 
can construct a simulator S which can solve the RSA[n,n] prob-
lem. This completed the proof of our theorem because we as-
sume that no one can solve the RSA[n,n] problem. The existence 
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of the impersonator X leads to the solution of the RSA[n，n] prob-
lem, which is a contradiction. The assumption that RSA[n,n 
is hard is reasonable,since at present, no one can solve and it is 
widely believed to be hard. 
Now we go through our argument by constructing such a 
simulator S which can solve the RSA[n,n] problem with the 
help of I. We assume there is a fair dealer V which gives S a 
fair instance of the RSA[n,n] problem. 
• Setup Phase. S received an instance of the RSA[n,n] prob-
lem from V. That is, S is given (n, Q) and is asked to find 
y such that y^ = Q mod n. S then gives n and g = 1 + n 
as mpk to impersonator X. 
• (Simulating the oracles.) Recalled that to model the attack 
scenario, X is given access to a number of oracles. Now J, 
a passive attacker, can listen to communication transcript 
and ask for the secret key for any identity 1. This is mod-
eled by the oracle CO and JCSO respectively. In the random 
oracle model, every hash function is also treated as oracle 
which the impersonator have access. The process that S 
handle the oracle query from I is called simulating the or-
acles or oracles simulation. Next we continue to show how 
S simulate the oracles for I. 
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• H oracle. Suppose X makes qh queries to the H oracle and 
let li denote the i — th query. S randomly chooses r and 
return Q = H{Ir). For other i ^ r, generate 工“ yi and 
compute H{Ii) = g^'yi^ mod 
• JCSO. Suppose J query the secret key for / � . S returns Xi, 
yi. Suppose it query a new identity then set H { r ) = 
g^'y'^ mod v? and return (x,, y'). This is called backpatch 
the random oracle H. The simulation failed if X query the 
secret key for Ir. 
• CO is stimulated by randomly generate zi, z^, c and com-
pute the commitment t = z^^ mod t? . Return the 
transcript {t, c, Zi, Z2). It can be shown that statistical dis-
tance between the simulated transcript and actual tran-
script is negligible. 
• (Gauntlet phase.) In the gauntlet phase, X chooses an iden-
tity Ig for impersonation. It is argued that I must choose 
one identity it has queried the H oracle. Otherwise the 
success probability is negligible. This argument is called 
the lunchtime argument. With probability 1/収，X chooses 
Ig = Ir. If Ig is not Ir, then we also say the simulation fails. 
• (Rewind Simulation.) Now suppose X can impersonate Ig 
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successfully. That is, X interactive with S in the identi-
fication protocol and is accepted. Let the communication 
transcript be (t, c, (^i, Z2)). Now, since X is a computer 
program, we can reset the environment back to the point 
where X just issue the commitment t. At this point, S issue 
a challenge d + c and T impersonate successfully again. We 
let the transcript of the second-run be (t,c,, 之 T h e 
process of resetting the environment (or state) of J is called 
rewind simulation. 
• (Witness Extraction.) S can then compute some useful 
information from the two transcripts. This is called witness 
extraction. Assume t = gV mod n? and Q = g^y^. 
= g_(yCz2y" mod U^ 
g % = 产 、 广 m o d n2 
X = {z[ - ZI)L{c — d) m o d n 
The last equation come from the fact that [t]g is unique 
modulo n and [1]夕=0. S can compute y as follow. 
t = mod n 
t = 广 mod n 
= ( 4 /幻广 mod n 
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Denote by s z^jz^ mod n. S then compute (d, /ci, k�)such 
that d = gcd(n, c — c') and kin + /c2(c - = d. If d ^ 1, 
then S successfully factorize n (since 0 < c, c' < n). Hence, 
/cin + A:2(c_c') = 1. u = 一 1 〜如(c-c') = mod n. 
Thus, y = u^'s^^ mod N. 
• S compute y such that y几=H{Ig) mod n and successfully 
solved the RSA[n,n] problem. 
• Probability of success depends on the simulation not failed. 
With probability I /qh , ^ choose Ig = Ir and it also im-
plies that Ig is not input of JCSO. Since qn is of poly-
nomial complexity, probability of successful simulation is 
non-negligible. 
Remarks: The proof required that gcd(n，c，-c)=l，thus, the chal-
lenge should be smaller than the smallest prime factor of n. By 
using g = 1 + n, efficiency can be improved. Also noted that 
order of 1 + n is n, the response zi will be in Z^ instead of in Z. 
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Now we can proceed to prove the imp-
ca-security of Paillier2-IBL It is in essence the same as Paillierl-
IBI with the simulator now having to simulate the Prover Oracle. 
We only outline how the prover oracle is simulated here. 
(Stimulating the prover oracle.) It is stimulated in Paillier2-
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IBI by backpatching the 6 oracle. Commitment t is randomly 
generated. After receiving the challenge c, backpatch 6{ 
The response is (2:1,2:2). 
A.2 Proof Sketch of Remaining Theorems 
{Proof Sketch of Theorems 5.3,5.4) 
• (Simulating the oracles.) JCSO, CO straight forward. VO 
is stimulated in a similar manner as in Paillier2-IBI. 
• (Witness Extraction.) Given two conversation transcripts 
by (Z, c, (zi, 22)) and (力,c'，（z;, 4 ) ) . Denote H{I) = Q. 
yc = Q mod N and y��二（22/4) mod N. Let 1 = /cie + 
k2�c丨-c), then y = Q^ ^ (2:2/4)^^ mod n. It successfully find 
the e-th root of Q modulo N and thus solves the RSA[n,e 
problem. 
{Proof Sketch of Theorems 5.5) 
• (Simulating key extraction oracle.) Simulating JCEO is 
straight forward by backpatching the H oracles. 
• (Simulating Prover Oracle) GMMV-IBI employ witness in-
distinguishable technique, simulator possess one set of wit-
ness and the prover oracle can be simulated using the wit-
ness. 
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• (Witness Extraction.) Given two conversation transcripts 
denoted by (t, c, (2；!, 2:2)) and (t, c'，(z[, 4 ) ) . 
{z[/zi)^ =(ncfc=i 而/11(4=1 而)2 (modAO. With probability 
1/2, the two square roots differ and gcd of their difference 
leaks the factorization of N. 
{Proof Sketch of Theorem 5.6) 
• (Simulating the oracles.) K£0 and VO are stimulated in 
a similar manner as in GMMV-IBI. 
• (Witness Extraction.) Given two conversation transcripts 
(t, c, (zi,z2)) and (t, c'’（:i，4))，it is straight forward to 
show (z[/zi)'^ = ( r U = i ^i? ( mod N). With prob-
ability 1/2, the two square roots differ and gcd of their 
difference leaks the factorization of N. 
• End of chapter. 
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